Making One
I was discussing
free-will and determinism with some friends. I have a lot to learn about what others have written on the subject. It has been suggested I look into Compatiblism, in particular, but I put down some thoughts while they are fresh.
We were viewing free-will and determinism in the
context of our observable environment, and some interesting ideas
were brought out. I'm inclined to believe that if everything we are
is determined by completely predictable natural laws, then all we
have is the illusion of free-will. A friend argued that if our
actions are ultimately governed by random events (such as quantum
events) then our choices are even less free, in that they are not
really our choices at all. We just flipped a coin and did what it
said. I still struggle to see true freedom in either case. If our
choices can be predicted in every detail in any practical sense, then
we are not choosing, but only following a predetermined course. This
still seems an inevitable conclusion to me from total predictability.
At the same time, I'm unwilling to claim that God exists outside of
natural laws (even though I readily admit I don't come close to
understanding all of those laws), so I don't like my previous
proposal that free-will is some super-natural control over the
interface between random events (quantum events?) and apparently
deterministic, macroscale events.
Continued discussion brought out
thoughts from another friend that have given me hope of finding a
solution that satisfies me. I'll quote, without permission, some parts of the exchange:
CB: "That is (to put this in more prescriptive terms), if
non-determinism can beget determinism [e.g. random behavior of
individual photons resulting in predictable behavior of many
photons], can determinism beget non-determinism?"
JLC: “We call that chaos theory, and the brain certainly qualifies.
But it appears that determinism can't beget non-determinism, it can
only beget EFFECTIVE non-determinism. Something that is effectively
non-deterministic is deterministic, but its behavior is so complex,
that the best way to figure out what it will do is often just to let
it do it and see. So this is a type of non-determinism in the sense
of 'predictability' but it is still deterministic in the sense of
whether it would do the exact same thing if placed in the exact same
situation.”
CB: “. . . would you
agree that taking a descriptive rather than prescriptive position on
(non-)determinism allows for non-determinism to emerge from
determinism? And if so, what are the objections to a descriptive
approach?”
JLC: “Yes, I do agree that you can create SEEMING non-determinism
from determinism. Pseudo random number generators in most programming
languages do exactly that.
“My only objection is that such seeming non-determinism doesn't
provide the type of freedom that Jonathan and others like him seem to
want. If I seed the number generator with the same seed, I get the
same result every time I run it. It SEEMS non-deterministic, until I
start playing with re-running the program and playing with the seed.
“This doesn't bother me for my definition of freedom, but it would
bother a Libertarianist. Because ultimately there IS something
fundamentally different between true non-determinism, and apparent
non-determinism. Just because it is CURRENTLY undetectable, does not
mean that it would remain undetectable. If I can create a simulation
of your brain, that always does the same thing on the same input,
given the same seed, then suddenly the determinism becomes apparent,
and the apparent non-determinism vanishes, even for a radical
empiricist.
“I guess you can summarize that last criticism by saying that
apparent non-determinism can vanish when we learn more, even for a
radical empiricist.”
JGC: “Does it change something if you can prove that, while
possible in theory, it will never be possible in practice to learn
enough to perfectly simulate a sufficiently complex system? In that
case could apparent non-determinism become effective non-determinism?
Would that allow us to live in a world that is fundamentally
deterministic but effectively non-deterministic from the point of
view of conscious will?”
JLC: “Perhaps, but I don't see how you prove that about the human
brain. It appears to me that you will be able to effectively simulate
the brain in the next 20 years or so.”
So I've given up, for the time, my
view of free-will that requires supernatural influence. I don't like that view. I am left to
ask if free will might be found in effective non-determinism? Can
the human brain, or the human being, be simulated to the point that a
person's every choice can be predetermined? I'm inclined to think
not. Some years ago I gave up the idea that I am in control of every
choice I feel I should be able to control. Most, almost all, of my
motivations and subsequent actions are determined by emotions and
habits that, in a given moment, are out of my control. What I like to
think remains in my control is the ability to shape my habits and
emotions over time. I can make small choices that result in a
happier, more productive me a year, or 10 years from now. Experience
forced me to give up the belief that I am capable of making any
choice I want at any given moment in time. I'm highly predictable,
but I cling to the notion that I am not totally predictable.
So what happens in 20 years when my
brain can be mapped so that any input given it will show with 100%
accuracy what outputs will result? Either I give up my illusion of
will, or I conclude that my brain cannot be perfectly simulated. I
may live in a deterministic reality, but my brain is effectively
non-deterministic—the only way to know absolutely what it will do
is to start it going and watch. How can this happen if I concede that
my brain can be duplicated? If I allow that chemistry and engineering
can advance to the point that my brain could be simulated down to the
atom, and that every neural impulse that determines what I do can be
copied perfectly to respond to every input in exactly the way I
would? How can I maintain a belief in effective non-determinism? I
want a cosmology that strictly obeys natural laws, but I want to be
me. I don't want to be predetermined. I concede that I'm highly
predictable, but I want to be at least effectively
unpredictable—at least a little bit.
The start of my hope is hidden in the
very claim that we will be able to effectively simulate the brain.
Simulating the brain itself is not really sufficient. My brain—a
physically finite object that takes in measurable inputs and produces
measurable outputs—isn't really the system we're interested in. We
want to know how I will interact with the world. My brain is a open
system that can assimilate a huge variety of inputs. To effectively
simulate my brain and my future choices, you must be able to
effectively simulate all of the future inputs to my brain. This very
quickly becomes a computationally intractable system as you try to
simulate more and more inputs, possibly requiring more computing
power than could be harnessed by turning all matter in our universe
to the function of computing the possible inputs and outcomes. Maybe
the best way to see what my brain will do is to make my brain and let
it run?
I can see one strong objection to my
proposal. There are bound to be many irrelevant inputs to predicting
my behavior. In fact, almost all inputs are irrelevant—most are too
far away or otherwise undetectable to my brain, and many that my
brain does detect it ignores. This leads me to conclude that almost
every action I will take will be predictable by other humans in the
not too distant future. What chance remains that it won't be every
action? Is there some real hope that I am at least a tiny bit
unpredictable? I invoke the web of human relations to maintain my
unpredictability. Not only must my brain be simulated, but every
other brain that is going to give me inputs, and every brain that is
going to give them inputs that will influence the inputs they give
me. The only practical approach might be to make our brains and see
what they do. Or maybe we can posit a day where we can simulate using
more power than is in our known universe? Maybe God can perfectly
predict all my actions, and my free-will is limited to my finite
perspective, and is predetermined in God's eyes?
I venture out into the realm of the
unmeasurable. I believe God and spirit are physical. They are made of
matter and energy like everything else that exists. For reasons given
elsewhere, I believe that we are in a stage of development where we
are unable to detect this type of matter or energy except by its
consequences on some of our complex, subjective, measurement
devices—our minds, hearts, and actions. Here is a set of inputs my
brain simulators can only simulate by random guesses. They can
trigger all of the religious inputs of my simulated brain and record
every action that might result, but they have no way to predict what
inputs God and the angels will send me. This still only pushes the
predictability back a level. When we become gods and angels we will
be able to measure and predict these inputs.
I'm not convinced it is true in any
practical sense that even God and the angels can predict all of the inputs. To predict the inputs into my human brain, you must
predict the inputs into the brains of God and the angels that will
influence me. To predict those inputs, you must predict an ever
expanding web of relationships in an ever expanding web of universes.
Does God know what I'm going to do? Pretty much. Does God know
everything He will do in the future? I like to think He still has
choices. If He might do something unpredictable, until He does it, He
doesn't know with absolute certainty what I will do. Do I know what
God will do? Sometimes. He's pretty predictable. But no more than I
am.
